We propose in this paper the Security Policy Language (SePL), which is a formal language for capturing and integrating distributed security policies. The syntax of SePL includes several operators for the integration of policies and it is endowed with a denotational semantics that is a generic semantics, i.e., which is independent of any evaluation environment. We prove the completeness of SePL with respect to sets theory. Furthermore, we provide a formalization of a subset of the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML), which is the well-known standard informal specification language of Web security policies. We provide also a semantics for XACML policy combining algorithms.
Introduction
Nowadays, there is a drastic growing of security threats, which benefit from security breaches in systems to jeopardize their security and achieve malicious goals such as thief and illegal access to information, identity masquerading, etc. The consequences of security attacks can be fatal to institutions and companies, which made security a major concern for people in industry and academia. In this context, building secure systems is becoming a paramount challenge mainly in a distributed environment where each system has its own security policies, which may conflict with policies of other systems. In such environment, security policies specification is based on standard languages, which are often informal and complex such as the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [27] ; the well-known standard informal specification language of Web security policies. Such complexity makes the learning curve of the proposed languages very high and increases the likelihood of having design errors. Accordingly, there is a desideratum for providing simple and formal models that capture such policies and allow to reason about them.
There are two main classes of approaches for formalizing security policies: Model and language based methods. Model based approaches leverage formalisms such as transition systems to capture policies. Model checking of system compliance to security properties is one of the main targets behind the design of such models. The main issue with such methods is their limited scalability when applied to huge policies.
Regarding language based approaches, several languages were proposed to specify security policies. XML-based specification languages use XML tags to describe security policies and rules between subjects and resources. Famous XML-based specification languages include Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [20] , XML Access Control Policy Specification Language (XACL) [8] , and Extensible Access Markup Control Language (XACML) [27] . The issue with such languages is that they are machine readable and so difficult to be understood. Furthermore, they lack the formal aspect that allows reasoning about them. Declarative languages provide a high level of simplicity and readability for the specification of security policies. We mention Ponder [9] as a famous declarative, object-oriented language for specifying policies for the security and management of distributed systems. The main issue with such languages is the lack of abstractness that allows to reason about correctness and completeness issues. Event based languages, such as Policy Description Language (PDL) [7] and DEFCon Policy Language (DPL) [21] , leverage events and actions to model security policies and rules between subjects and resources. Some of these languages put more focus on actions rather than data while others express constraints on event flows. The main issue with such languages is their complexity and sometimes their modeling of low level details. Algebraic languages allow to formally define security policies. An important feature of algebraic security policy languages is their simplicity, powerful expressiveness and compactness.
We advocate in this work the need for a simple, formal, precise and rigorous language to guarantee the absence of inconsistencies in policies, reason about their integration, and prove their correctness. To achieve this goal, we define in this paper a new language called Security Policy Language (SePL) for the specification of distributed security policies. We also show how the language can be leveraged to define the integration of policies. In addition, we present a formalization of a large subset of the latest version of XACML based on SePL, which provides a simple understanding of that language. The contributions of this paper are three-folds:
• The proposal of a new formal Security Policy Language (SePL) for the specification and integration of security policies.
• The elaboration of a generic denotational semantics for SePL that is capable of expressing complex security policies.
• The formalization of almost all XACML policy combining algorithms based on SePL and the proof of the completeness of SePL with respect to set theory.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to the presentation of the syntax and semantics of SePL. We provide a formalization of XACML based on SePL in Section 3. We provide in Section 5 a minimal version of SePL. Section 4 is devoted to the proof of completeness of SePL. In section 6, we provide a comparison of our work with the related work. Finally, we provide some concluding remarks in Section 7.
Security Policy Language: Syntax and Semantics
We present in this section the syntax and semantics of the Security Policy Language (SePL). We use some of the abbreviations and notations that we exhibit in the following. Let A =< a 1 , . . . , a n > be a list of attributes such that the domain of a i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is denoted by D(a i ). , for all i in {1, . . . , n}. We assume also that a set d can be defined either by explicitly giving its elements (e.g {v 1 . . . , v m }) or by a predicate (e.g {x : D(a) | x = v}). We assume that denotes (D(a 1 ), . . . , D(a n )) and ⊥ denotes (∅, . . . , ∅). We assume also that the value of an attribute can stay unknown: for example a 1 = x where x is variable in D(a 1 ). If the name of the variable is not important, we simply write a 1 =?. When there is no ambiguity, ? is also used to abbreviate (?, . . . , ?) which is a tuple where all its attributes have unknown values, i.e., (x 1 , . . . , x n ).
Syntax
The syntax of SePL is given by the following BNF grammar:
• ε denotes the empty policy.
• 0 denotes the policy that denies all actions.
• 1 denotes the policy that accepts all actions.
• R =< ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 > denotes the policy that accepts actions accepted by ϕ 1 and not denied by ϕ 2 and denies actions denied by ϕ 2 and not accepted by ϕ 1 .
• ¬P denotes the policy that accepts actions that P denies and denies actions that P accepts.
• P behaves like P except that it transforms the indeterminate part of P to not applicable. In other words, if the accept part or the deny part of P is indeterminate, it becomes an empty set.
• P 1 · P 2 denotes the sequential composition of policies. This gives the result of the first one applicable. If no one is applicable, the result is either not applicable or indeterminate if P 1 and P 2 are indeterminate.
• P 1 P 2 denotes the policy that gives priority to accept, i.e, it accepts an action when P 1 or P 2 accepts it and denies an action when no one of them accepts it and at least one of them denies it. Otherwise, the policy is either not applicable or indeterminate if P 1 or P 2 is indeterminate.
• P 1 P 2 : This is the dual part of since it gives priority to deny. It denies an action when P 1 or P 2 denies it and accepts an action when no one of them denies it and at least one of them accepts it. Otherwise, the policy is either not applicable or indeterminate if P 1 or P 2 is indeterminate.
• P 1 P 2 denotes the parallel composition of policies. It accepts an action when both of them accept and denies when both of them deny. Otherwise, the policy is either not applicable or indeterminate if P 1 or P 2 is indeterminate.
• P 1 + P 2 denotes the choice between two policies. It accepts when one of them accept and no one denies, and denies when one of them denies and no one accepts. Otherwise, the policy is either not applicable or indeterminate if P 1 or P 2 is indeterminate.
• P 1 − P 2 denotes the policy that accepts when P 1 accepts and P 2 is not applicable and denies when P 1 denies and P 2 is not applicable. Otherwise, the policy is either not applicable or indeterminate if P 1 or P 2 is indeterminate.
• P 1 P 2 . This behaves like P 1 − P 2 except that the result is indeterminate ("?") when there is an overlap between P 1 and P 2 (i.e. the accepts of P 1 together with its denies is not disjoint from the accepts of P 2 added to its denies) .
To reduce the number of parentheses when writing properties, we assume the following precedence between operators (from strong to weak) ¬, , ., ||, , , +. For example P 1 + ¬P 2 .P 3 ||P 4 is same as P 1 + (((¬P 2 ).P 3 )||P 4 ). Notice that SePL does not explicitly contain the composition rules (combining algorithms) used in XACML, but, as we show later that, it is expressive enough to specify them. Also, the operators of SePL are not independent from each others. We show later that we can remove many of them without affecting the expressiveness of the language. In fact, we can keep only the operators belonging to the set {¬, , , +, } without affecting the expressiveness of the language.
Semantics
• Preliminary definitions: Let A = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) and B = (β 1 , . . . , β n ) be two tuples of n set elements. In the sequel, we define the following semantic operators:
The absolute semantics of a policy P , denoted by
where A is the acceptance domain of P and B is its denying domain. The domain that is not explicitly accepted or denied by a policy defines implicitly its "nonapplicable" domain. More formally,
is inductively defined as shown by Table 1 where (A 1 , D 1 ) denotes the semantics of P 1 , (A 2 , D 2 ) denotes the semantics of P 2 and (A, D) denotes the semantics of P .
The absolute semantics gives the meaning of a policy independent from the environment in which it will be evaluated. One of the advantages of this semantics is that any optimization or simplification applied to it can be used for any environment. This means that we can reduce the time of the evaluation of the semantics by optimizing this semantics one time and use it many times with different environments. Another advantage is that it allows to prove some general results independent from a specific environment.
• Relative Semantics (
The semantics of a policy P relative to an environment Γ, denoted by [ [ P ] ] Γ , returns the decision of the policy P regarding Γ. In practice, the environment Γ contains both the action that we want to execute together with its context (the values of the variables of the environment during its execution). For our semantics, the result is (α, β) where {α, β} ⊂ {T, ?, F} (T stands for True, F stands for False, and ? stands for unknown). Usually, the result is considered as permit if α = T, deny if β = T, otherwise the result is either not applicable or indeterminate. It is non applicable if α = β = F and it is indeterminate if α and β are in {(F, ?), (?, F), (?, ?)}. More details about these notations will be given within the section regarding the formalization of the XACML language. 
More formally, let Γ = [a 1 = v 1 , . . . , a n = v n ] be an environment where v i ∈ D(a i ) ∪ {?} and "a =?" means that the value of the attribute a is unknown. Let P be a policy such that
, as follows:
Notice that the truth tables of the three-valued logic is as shown hereafter:
It is sometimes useful to define [[ − ]] Γ in a compositional way as shown in Table 2 where
where a − b denotes a ∧ ¬b
Three-Valued Logic: choices and consequences
The first famous three-valued logic has been proposed by Lukasiewicz in [1] since 1920. A formula can be evaluated to true (T), false (F) or undecided (?). This third value makes the logic complicated and we need to make some choices about the evaluation of the combination of formula using classical boolean operator. For example, the result of "?∨¬?" is it true? the result of "?∧¬?" is it true? is x → y is equal to x ∨ ¬y?. Beside the logic proposed by Lukasiewicz, many others were proposed to reflect these different choices. The Kleene three-valued logic [2] and the Fitting logic [5] are the most famous. Within the Lukasiewicz, Kleene and Fitting logics, we have the following properties:
• Idempotency (x ∨ x ≡ x and x ∧ x ≡ x); 
• Double Negation (¬¬x ≡ x);
• De Morgan (¬(x ∨ y) ≡ ¬x ∧ ¬y and ¬(x ∧ y) ≡ ¬x ∨ ¬y);
• Contraposition (x → y ≡ ¬y → ¬x).
Lukasiewicz and Kleene logic have the Equivalence (x ↔ y ≡ (x → y) ∧ (y → ¬x)) but not the Fitting one. The Kleene and Fitting logic have the Syllogism ((x ↔ y) ∧ (y → z) ≡ (x → z)) but not the Lukasiewicz one. None of the the previous logics has the Excluded Middle ((x ∨ ¬x) ≡ T ) or the Contradiction ((x ∧ ¬x) ≡ F ). For our semantics, we adopt the following convention: The value "?" is used to represent a formula that can neither be evaluated to true (T) nor to false (F) due to some missing values for a part of its variables. For example, x ∧ y can be considered as ? if the values of x and y are unknown. However, x ∧ (¬x ∧ y) will be evaluated to F even x and y are unknown since
Notice that the problem of knowing whether a formula is valid or not is decidable. A symbol "?" can be substituted by a fresh variable in a formula.
Formalizing XACML Policies based on SePL
We show in this section how we can leverage SePL to formalize XACML policies.
Overview of XACML
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) [27] is a set of XML schemas that define the specifications of a language for access control policies. As shown in Figure 3 .1, a XACML policy is composed of a target, an obligation and a set of rules. Rules are also composed of target conditions and effects or permissions.
Because a policy may contain multiple rules with different decisions, we need to clarify how to build the decision of a policy from the decision of its rules. To this end, we formalized the "Rules Combining Algorithm" that was proposed for this purpose by OASIS. It is also possible to aggregate policies to form a "PolicySet". A Policyset has also a target that limits the scope of its applicability and an algorithm that defines its global decision from the local decisions returned by its policies. The target of an access request is first compared to the target of a Policyset, if they are different this Policyset is not applicable. Otherwise, the target of the request is compared to the targets of policies inside the Policyset. A policy is qualified as not applicable when its target is different from the target of the request. When a policy and a request agree on the target, the request is analyzed by the rules inside the policy: A rule is applicable if its targets include the target of the request and its condition is evaluated to true.
The XACML standard describes four types of Combining Algorithms. Hereafter, we describe how a PolicySet combines the results of its policies. The same algorithms can be used to combine the decisions of rules to build the decision of their policies.
• Permit-overrides: A PolicySet accepts if at least one of its policies accepts and denies if no one of its policies accepts and at least one denies. Otherwise, the PolicySet is not applicable.
• Deny-overrides: It returns "deny" if at least one policy denies and it returns "accept" if no policy denies and at least one policy accepts. Otherwise, the policy is not applicable.
• First Applicable: It accepts if there is at least one policy that accepts and this policy is not proceeded by a denying one and vise-versa.
• Only-one-applicable: if more than one policy is applicable, then the result is indeterminate. Otherwise, the result of the unique applicable policy will be considered.
Abbreviations
For the sake of making the presentation clear, we adopt the following abbreviations:
• We use the terms N/A, Permit, Deny, Indeterminate(P), Indeterminate(D), Indeterminate(PD) as an abbreviation of the following situations:
• We denote by ϕ → p and ϕ → d the following policies:
we can use the following abbreviation:
• If op is a binary SePL operator, we denote by op(P 1 , P 2 ) the prefix notation of P 1 op P 2 . For example, P 1 P 2 can be denoted by (P 1 , P 2 ). The result can be generalized to n compositions since all the operators of SePL are transitive. For example, P 1 P 2 . . . P n can be represented by (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ).
• The policy φ : P is the abbreviation defined inductively as follows:
Also, we update the precedence between operators (from strong to weak) ":", "¬", " ", ".", "||", " ", " ", "+". Table 3 .3 outlines a BNF grammar that we propose to capture a significant subset of XACML-3.0. The literature does not contain such grammar and it is not simple to build it from XACML-3.0 specification. This will be useful also to automatically build a lexical analyzer and parser for XACML-3.0 using tools such as Lex and Yacc [6] .
From XACML to SePL
The transformation function − from XACML to SePL can be inductively defined as shown in Table 3 .4. Its definition is based on our own understanding of the XACML-3.0 textual description. Each rule is dedicated to a specific component (PolicySet, Policy, Rules, etc.) of XACML-3.0, where bold terms denote terminal words. For example, transforming an XACML condition (described by "< Condition > BooleanExpression < / Condition >") to SePL turns to extract the BooleanExpression and ignore the rest.
We have also developed, using PHP and XML, a web based application allowing to automatically convert XACML security policies to SPL as shown by 
Example
The XACML policy, given in Table 4 , includes two rules and is extracted from [27]: the first one provides the reading right of the file secret.txt to only Alice or Bob while the second rule provides access for anyone to that file. The SePL term related to this XACML policy is as follows: Table 3 : A BNF Grammar for a Subset of XACML-3.0 P DP policies ::= P olicySet | P olicy
::= P olicy | P olicy P olicies
P Sheader
::= PolicySetId = string Version = number PolicyCombiningAlgId = P alg P header
::= PolicyeId = string Version = number RuleCombiningAlgId = Ralg Rheader ::= RuleId = string Effect = REf f ect P alg ::= only-one-applicable | Ralg
SePL formal semantics for XACML combining algorithms
We provide in this section a SePL-based semantics for XACML combining algorithms. The proofs of the conformance of our semantics for each XACML combining algorithm and its XACML specification are provided in the appendix.
Permit-override:
Permit-overrides between P 1 , . . . , P n , denoted by P OR(P 1 , . . . , P n ): It accepts if at least one policy accepts and denies if no one accept and at least one denies. It can be formalized in SePL as follows:
Deny-overrides:
Deny-overrides between P 1 , . . . , P n , denoted by DOR(P 1 , . . . , P n ): It denies if at least one policy denies and accepts if no one denies and at least one accepts. It can be formalized in SePL as follows:
First-Applicable between P 1 , . . . , P n , denoted by F A(P 1 , . . . , P n ): It accepts if there is at least one policy that accepts and that is not proceeded by a denying one and vise-versa. It can be formalized in SePL as follows:
Only-one-applicable:
Only-one-applicable between P 1 , . . . , P n , denoted by OOA(P 1 , . . . , P n ): if more than one policy is applicable, the result will be neither accept nor deny (without decision). Otherwise, the unique applicable policy will be applied. It is formalized in SePL as follows:
<Policy PolicyId="SimplePolicy1" Version="1.0" RuleCombiningAlgId="first-applicable"> <Description>Access control policy for "secret.txt" file</Description> <Target> <AnyOf> <AllOf> <Match MatchId="string-equal"> <AttributeValue >secret.txt</AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false" Category="resource" AttributeId="resource-id" DataType="string"/> </Match> </AllOf> </AnyOf> </Target> <Rule RuleId= "SimpleRule1" Effect="Deny"> <Description> Don't allow write in secret.txt </Description> <Target> <AnyOf> <AllOf> <Match MatchId="string-equal"> <AttributeValue >write</AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false" Category="action" AttributeId="action-id" DataType="string"/> </Match> </AllOf> </AnyOf> </Target> </Rule> <Rule RuleId= "SimpleRule2" Effect="Deny"> <Description> Alice cannot read "secret.txt" </Description> <Target> <AnyOf> <AllOf> <Match MatchId="string-equal"> <AttributeValue >Alice</AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false" Category="access-subject" AttributeId="subject-id" DataType="string"/> </Match> </AllOf> </AnyOf> <AnyOf> <AllOf> <Match MatchId="string-equal"> <AttributeValue >read</AttributeValue> <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false" Category="action" AttributeId="action-id" DataType="string"/> </Match> </AllOf> </AnyOf> </Target> </Rule> </Policy> 
T argets : Rheader ( Rules ) (P olicies) P olicy P olicies = P olicy , P olicies
PolicySetId = string Version = number PolicyCombiningAlgId = P alg = P alg
Category= Subject AttributeId = AttSubject DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean = AttSubject Category= resource AttributeId = AttResource DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean = AttResource Category= action AttributeId = AttAction DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean = AttAction Category= environment AttributeId = AttEnv DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean = AttEnv (Condition) < Condition > BooleanExpression < / Condition > = BooleanExpression 3.5.5. Deny-unless-permit Deny-unless-permit between P 1 , . . . , P n is formalized in SePL as follows:
3.5.6. Permit-unless-deny Permit-unless-deny between P 1 , . . . , P n is formalized in SePL as follows:
Some Benefits of XACML Formalization
It is a known fact that formalization removes ambiguity from the textual description of semantics and opens the door to a variety of automatic analysis. Formalization transforms XACML policies to mathematical objects and allows to extract their properties (complete, conflicts, etc.) and their interrelationship (include, disjoint, etc.). Here are some useful applications:
• Simplifying security policies: Given a security policy P , we want to simplify it as much as possible. If a security policy is formalized as a combination of boolean expressions, as in SePL, many techniques allowing their simplifications exist. These kinds of simplifications can be useful to reduce the time of verifying complex security policies.
• Detecting conflicts and redundancies: Given two security policies P and Q, we want to compare them as it is reported in [13] , i.e, P is equivalent to Q, P is included in Q, P and Q are disjoint, etc. This kind of analysis can be used to detect a conflict between rules (when some of them authorize access denied by others). For instance, if one rule allows an employee to get access into the system between 8am and 7pm and another denies the access between 5am and 8am, then there is a conflict. In fact, if the combining algorithm is "only-one-applicable", then the result can be indeterminate. It is preferable to detect this kind of overlap and show it to the end-user since they usually correspond to design errors in security policies. For the SePL language, since security policies are transformed into boolean expressions, different kinds of comparisons become easy. For instance, to compare whether P 1 and P 2 are equivalent or not, it is enough to check whether the expression (P 1 ⇒ P 2 ) ∧ (P 2 ⇒ P 1 ) can be proved.
• Quantify distances between security policies: Given two security policies P and Q, we want to measure the distance between them. Many works like [16] and [22] have already addressed this problem. Our absolute semantics is helpful to define metrics allowing to measure distance between security policies. In fact, this semantics transforms a security policy to a domain (acceptance domain, reject domain). Therefore, we can use the Euclidean distance or other metrics in these domains to quantify similarity between them.
We have also developed, using PHP and XML, a web based application allowing to automatically measure distances between XACML policies, transformed to SPL , using a variety of metrics as shown by Figure 3 .3. This I D shows the part of the domain where P is mute. If P is the whole security policy, then it is incomplete. In fact, a good security policy should have I D = ∅ (i.e. any action should be either denied or authorized). If for example, there is a rule stating that an employee can get access into the system between 8am to 5pm and a rule stating that the same employee cannot get access into the system between in [7pm, 8am], then it is incomplete since we don't know whether the employee is authorized or not in ]5am, 7am[. Let P be a security policy such that its relative semantics in SePL is (B • Using MTBDD techniques and tools: Since our relative semantics transforms XACML policies into boolean expressions where variables are elementary conditions, we can proceed like in [23] or in [12] to produce Multi-Terminal Binary Decision Diagrams (MTBDD). This MTBDD is useful to quickly analyze security policies and compare them. For instance, suppose that
, where a1 is "role = admin", a2 is "f ile = pwd", a3 is "access = write" and a4 is "role = student". An MTBDD for P can be as shown in Figure 3 .4. The reader can refer to [10] to know how we can produce a MTBDD with optimal size.
For MTBDDs, we can answer YES or NO questions like is it possible that "student" can "write" in the "pwd" file. We can answer queries such as who has access to "pwd" file and we can compare two policies. A tool like Margave [14] is suitable to make this analysis.
Combining MTBDDs related to two security policies can reveal similarity and dissimilarity between them as shown in Figure 3 .5, where leafs having two similar labels show similarity and leafs having two different labels denote dissimilarity. A tool like Exam [22] can do this kind of analysis. Other interesting formalizations and analyses are also possible. For instance, Bryans et al. [11] formalize a fragment of XACML by translating it to the process algebra CSP [4] . This gives the possibility of using model checkers such as FDR to verify properties of security policies and to compare them to each others.
Completeness of SePL
Theorem 4.1. The language is complete with respect to set theory according to the following meaning: let P and P be two policies such that
we can build using the operator of the SePL a policy where the semantics has the form (f (A, D, A , D ), g((A, D, A , D ) ) where f and g are built based on the combination of ∪, ∩, − and complement and f (A, D, A , D ) and g(A, D, A , D ) are disjoint. The importance of such result is that it gives a lower bound for the expressiveness of SePL that seems to be enough for capturing almost all combining algorithms of XACML since they are related to combining sets (accepting and denying sets).
Proof. If we are able to build the policies F such that ((A, D, A , D ) ). Then, since f (A, D, A , D ) and g((A, D, A , D ) are disjoint, we deduce that
We notice also that if we are able to build F , it is immediate that we can build G. Now, let us prove that we can build F . We do the proof by induction on the size of F . We show that we can build F if it contains zero operator then we suppose that we can build it for any size lower or equal than n and prove that that we can build it for a size n + 1.
• n = 0: In this case f (A, D, A , D ) has one of the following forms:
this case it is immediate that F = (¬P )||1
• f (A, D, A , D ) = A , in this case it is immediate that F = P ||1
• f (A, D, A , D ) = D , in this case it is immediate that F = (¬P )||1
• n + 1: In this case there exist f 1 and f 2 such that size(f 1 ) ≤ n, size(f 2 ) ≤ n and f (A, D, A , D ) has one of the following forms:
By induction, it follows that there exist F 1 and
, ⊥) and we conclude that
) and we conclude that
By induction, it follows that there exist
It follows from the definition of the semantics of
Corollary 4.2. Let P and P two policies such that [[ P ]] = (A, D) and [[ P ]] = (A , D ).
The previous theorem gives an algorithm that allows to construct Q such that
The algorithm is as follows:
1: function Semantics2Policy
2:
Input: (A, D) , (A , D ) and (f, g)
3:
Output:
The function S2P is defined as follows:
1: function S2P case A: return P ||1
5:
case D: return ¬P ||1 6: case A : return P ||1
7:
case D : return ¬P ||1 8: case
case
10:
Proof. It is immediate from the constructive proof of Theorem 4.1
Simplifying SePL
Definition 5.1. Let P 1 and P 2 be two policies such that [[
We say that:
• P 1 is lower than P 2 , denoted by
• P 1 is equivalent to P 2 , denoted by P 1 ≈ P 2 if P 1 P 2 and P 2 P 1 .
Proposition 5.2. Let P 1 , P 2 and P 3 be three policies. We have:
Proposition 5.3. Let P 1 , P 2 and P 3 be three policies. We have the following results:
Proof. Most of them are immediate from the definition of the semantics Theorem 5.4. The following language has the same expressivity as SePL:
, then from Corollary 4.2 we have:
Comparison with the Related Work
The standard language XACML is increasingly used in a wide variety of domains. A security policy can involve a big number of rules combined using different algorithms. However, since the semantics of XACML is described using the natural language, it will be difficult and time consuming for humans to get its meaning and analyze it. For that reason, many formal languages have been defined during the few past years and used to capture and analyze security policies specified in XACML or other security policy languages. We review in what follows these research initiatives and pinpoint the differences with our work. 
The interpretation of D-Algebra on XACML decisions is as follows:
where ∅ is the empty policy, {p} is permit, {d} is deny, { n a } is not applicable, {p, d} is conflict, {p, n a } is indeterminate permit, {d, n a } is indeterminate deny and {p, d, n a } is indeterminate permit-deny.
• 0 is the empty set.
• ¬x is ({p, d, n a } − x).
• x ⊕ D y is x ∪ y.
• x ⊗ D y is defined by axiom 7.
The formalization of permit-overrides of two policies x and y in D-Algebra is given by f po (x, y) as follows:
where (x D y) and (x D y) are shortcuts for ¬(¬x ⊕ D ¬y) and (x D ¬y) respectively. D-Algebra is neither conform with XACML-3.0 nor with XACML-2.0. As in [25] , we show in Table 7 the result of applying the "permit-overrides" algorithm for composing P 1 = {p, n a } (Indeterminate Permit) and P 2 = {d} (Deny). The result expected by XACML-3.0 is "Indeterminate Permit-Deny", however D-Algebra returns conflict.
PBel Logic. In [17, 18] , the authors use a four value logic (grant, deny, conflict, undefined) called PBel and it is derived from the Blenap Logic [3] . They also define a query language allowing to specify questions related to policy analysis such as conflict freedom and gap freedom policies. Queries are finally transformed into a fragment of the first order logic for which satisfiability and validity checks can be done by SAT solvers or BDDs.
The syntax of PBel is as shown in the following BNF grammar:
Refinement where ap i are access predicates, b is either tt (permit) of f f (deny) and v is either ⊥ (nonapplicable) or (indeterminate, i.e., both permit and deny arise). p⊕q grants (respectively denies) an access if at least one accepts (receptively denies) and the other is either accept (respectively deny) or not applicable. p[v → q] yields p if p = v and q otherwise. Using this semantics, the authors formalize the "permit-overrides" algorithm as follows:
However, as shown in [25] , this formalization is not consistent with XACML. In fact, the result of "permitoverrides" algorithm for composing P 1 = (Indeterminate) and P 2 = f f (deny) should be, according to XACML, indeterminate and not deny as returned by this logic.
XACML Logic. In [25] , the authors proposed an XACML logic having the syntax shown in Table  6 :
• The semantics of Match, Target and Condition is given by a function [
[−] ] returning results in the three-valued lattice V 3 ({ , I, ⊥}, ≤), where ≤ I ≤ ⊥ and means match (also means true or applicable), ⊥ means not match (also means false or not applicable) and I means indeterminate.
• The semantics of a Match M for a given query Q, denoted by
is if M ∈ Q, ⊥ if M ∈ Q and I if there is an error during evaluation.
• The semantics of a Condition C for a given query Q is eval(C, Q), where eval is a given function that evaluates conditions.
• The semantics of composed elements using ∧ such that
where gives the least upper bound according to the lattice V 3 .
• The semantics of composed elements using ∨ such that
where gives the greatest lower bound according to the lattice V 3 .
• To give the semantics of a Rule, the authors extended
where p is Permit, d is Deny, I p is Indeterminate Permit, I d is Indeterminate Deny, I pd is Indeterminate Permit-Deny, and ⊥ is Not match.
• The semantics of a Rule R =< * , T , C >, where * is either p or d, is as follows: Table 7 : Consistency of various logics with respect to XACML
• For the combining algorithms "p o ", "d o ", "f a " and "o − 1 − a", different lattices and combining rules are used to define the semantics. For the p o for example, the lattice L p−o of Figure 6 .1 is used. For a sequence S =< P 1 , . . . , P n > of policies, the permit override of S, denoted by p−o (S), is p−o {s 1 , . . . , s n }, where s i is the semantics of P i and p−o is the greatest lower bound according to the lattice L p−o .
• The authors defined also an equivalent semantics to V 6 , called P , based on the set
] is equivalent to I dp , [1, 0] is equivalent to d and
Fine-grained Integration Algebra (FIA). In [23] , Rao et al. proposed a Fine-grained Integration Algebra, denoted by FIA, for policy integration. It is a three-valued and language-independent algebra defined by the following element (Σ, P Y, P N, +, &, ¬, Π dc ), where Σ is a vocabulary of attribute names and their domains, P Y and P N are two policy constants, + and & are two binary operators, and ¬ and Π dc are two unary operators. The semantics of a policy P can be considered as a 2-tuple (R P Y , R P N ) where R P Y and R P N are the sets of requests that are permitted and denied by P respectively, and R P Y ∩ R P N = ∅. A policy P is considered as not applicable, if the request is not in R P Y ∪ R P N . The semantics of P can also be viewed as a function mapping each request to a value in {Y, N, N A}. A request r is a set of pairs { (a 1 , v 1 ), (a 2 , v 2 ) , . . . , (a n , v n )} where, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a i is an attribute name and v i is a value in the domain of a i , e. g. r = {(role, manager), (act, read), (time, 10am)}. P Y is a policy constant that permits everything whereas P N is the one that denies everything.
, Π dc (P ) = ({r ∈ P Y and r satisfies dc}, {r ∈ P N and r satisfies dc}). The authors used FIA to express the following XACML policy combining algorithms: Permit-overrides, Deny-overrides, First-one-applicable, Only-one-applicable. For instance, the combination of policies P 1 , . . . , P n under the algorithm Permit-overrides is expressed by P 1 + . . . + P n . Nevertheless, no one of these combination algorithms is XACML compatible since the algebra does not deal with indeterminate situation such that Indeterminate Permit and Indeterminate Deny. Furthermore, the authors do not give any translation function from XACML to FIA.
Defeasible Description Logic (DDL). In [15], Kolovski et al. used an extended version of Description Logic called Defeasible Description Logic (DDL).
The authors succeed to transform the main concepts of XACML (attribute, value, effect, Rule, Policy) to DDL in order to make different formal analysis such as policy comparison and verification. They claimed that their XACML formalization supports Permit-Overrides, Deny-Overrides and First-Applicable combining algorithms. However, there XACML formalizations are not compatible with XACML since they do not handle indeterminate cases like Indeterminate Permit, Indeterminate Deny and Indeterminate Permit-Deny. Logic is endowed with a semantics that is independent from any evaluaion model √ √
Advantages of using SePL. Here, we compare the previous logics to SePL. Table 8 summarizes this comparison.
• Contrarily to the XACML logic, SePL, Belnap-Logic and D−Algebra are independent from XACML. This means that if we want to formalize a larger subset of XACML, we do not necessarily need to extend the language itself. Besides, other policy languages, especially those used to specify firewall policies, can also be formalized using languages like SePL, Belnap-Logic and D − Algebra.
• The compatibility of SePL has been formally proved for almost all the combining algorithms. For Belnap Logic and D-Algebra, there is a proof that they are not compatible and for V 6 and P there is neither proof of compatibility nor a proof of incompatibility for all combining algorithms.
• Like V 6 and P , SePL addresses the recent version XACML-3.0. However, SePL formalizes a larger fragment of XACML-3.0 than V 6 and P and it includes most of combining algorithms.
• The SePL logic is endowed with an absolute semantics based on set theory allowing to understand the meaning of operators and policies and to analyze them outside any interpretation model. Another interesting application of this semantics is that it allows easily quantify distance between XACML policies. In fact, the absolute semantics of a policy is a domain (a subsets of D) so measuring distances between policies is equivalent to measuring distance between domains and there are many distance metrics allowing that such as Euclidean distance.
• Many Multi-valued logics (3-valued, 4-valued, 6-valued) have been used to formalize XACML semantics. However, it was not always clearly justified how many values we need and why. This is not the case for SePL, since the semantics of policy is a pair where each element has 3 possible values (T, F or ?), we obtain an 8-valued logic ((T, T), (T, F), {(T, ?), (F, T), (F, ?), (?, ?)} allowing to easily distinguish the six different scenarios of XACML-3.0 (P emit, Deny, IndeterminateP ermit, IndeterminateDeny, IndeterminateP ermitDeny and N otApplicable).
Conclusion
We presented in this paper a simple, formal, and compact security policy language called SePL. We have shown how complex real-world security policy languages, such as XACML-3.0 can be captured in a simple and understandable way using SePL. Furthermore, we proved the completeness of SePL with respect to set theory and we proposed a tool allowing to automatically transform XACML policies to SPL and measure distances between them.
Our future work includes the extension of the tool so that we can simplify security policies, detect their conflict, redundancy and incompleteness, and integrate the MTBDD techniques to answer more questions about them.
[27] OASIS. 
Deny-overrides:
According to the XACML specification [27], we have: The deny overrides combining algorithm is intended for those cases where a deny decision should have priority over a permit decision. This algorithm has the following behavior. 1. If any decision is "Deny", the result is "Deny". 2. Otherwise, if any decision is "IndeterminateDP", the result is "IndeterminateDP". 3. Otherwise, if any decision is "IndeterminateD" and another decision is ?IndeterminateP or Permit, the result is "IndeterminateDP". 4. Otherwise, if any decision is "IndeterminateD", the result is "IndeterminateD". 5. Otherwise, if any decision is "Permit", the result is "Permit". 6. Otherwise, if any decision is "IndeterminateP", the result is "IndeterminateP". 7. Otherwise, the result is "NotApplicable".
Our formalization feet with the XACML requirement and the proof is similar to the previous one.
First-Applicable:
According to the XACML specification [27], we have: The following is a non-normative informative description of the "First-Applicable? rule-combining algorithm of a policy. Each rule SHALL be evaluated in the order in which it is listed in the policy. For a particular rule, if the target matches and the condition evaluates to "True", then the evaluation of the policy SHALL halt and the corresponding effect of the rule SHALL be the result of the evaluation of the policy (i.e. "Permit" or "Deny"). For a particular rule selected in the evaluation, if the target evaluates to "False" or the condition evaluates to "False", then the next rule in the order SHALL be evaluated. If no further rule in the order exists, then the policy SHALL evaluate to "NotApplicable". If an error occurs while evaluating the target or condition of a rule, then the evaluation SHALL halt, and the policy shall evaluate to "Indeterminate", with the appropriate error status.
We consider the following cases:
It follows that:
where a 1 ∈ {F, ?}. It follows that:
follows that: Only-one-applicable between P 1 , . . . , P n , denoted by OOA(P 1 , . . . , P n ): if more than one policy is applicable, the result will be neither accept nor deny (without decision). Otherwise, the unique applicable policy will be applied.
It can be formalized in SePL as follows:
OOA(P 1 , . . . , P n ) ≈ (P 1 Σ n i=2 P i ) + . . . + (P j Σ n i=1,i =j P i ) + . . . + (P n Σ n−1 i=1 P i )
.
According to the XACML specification [27], we have: " In the entire set of policies in the policy set, if no policy is considered applicable by virtue of its target, then the result of the policy-combination algorithm SHALL be "NotApplicable". If more than one policy is considered applicable by virtue of its target, then the result of the policy combination algorithm SHALL be "Indeterminate". If only one policy is considered applicable by evaluation of its target, then the result of the policycombining algorithm SHALL be the result of evaluating the policy. If an error occurs while evaluating the target of a policy, or a reference to a policy is considered invalid or the policy evaluation results in "Indeterminate, then the policy set SHALL evaluate to "Indeterminate", with the appropriate error status."
We consider the following cases: Table |} (T, F ∨ (T ∧ ¬T ))) = {|From the truth Table |} (T, F )) = {|Definition of Permit |} Permit 2. Suppose that P = P 1 . . . P n and for all i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have [[ Table |} (F, d ∨ T ) = {|From the truth Table |} (F, T )) = {|Definition of Deny |} Deny
Permit-unless-deny
Permit-unless-deny between P 1 , . . . , P n is formalized in SePL as follows:
DU P (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ≈ (P 1 . . . P n ).1
According to the XACML specification [27], we have:
The "Permit-unless-deny" combining algorithm is intended for those cases where a deny decision should have priority over a permit decision, and an "Indeterminate" or "NotApplicable" must never be the result. It is particularly useful at the top level in a policy structure to ensure that a PDP will always return a definite "Permit" or "Deny" result. This algorithm has the following behavior. 1. If any decision is "Deny", the result is "Deny". 2. Otherwise, the result is "Permit".
